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（内容の要旨） 
This thesis is a collection of three essays on mechanism design. 
I study three economic problems on auction theory, matching theory, and social 
choice theory. In each problem, I design a mechanism which satisfies ``desirable 
properties", such as efficiency, fairness, and incentive compatibility. 
In Chapter 1, I study multi-unit ascending-bid auctions. Lawrence M. 
Ausubel (2004) introduces a new ascending-bid auction rule for multiple 
homogeneous objects, called the Ausubel auction, which is a dynamic counterpart of 
the Vickrey auction. He claims that in the Ausubel auction with private values, 
sincere bidding by all bidders is an ex post perfect equilibrium, which is a tuple of 
strategies constituting ex post equilibria at all nodes of the dynamic auction game. 
However, I show that this claim does not hold in general. In my counterexample, 
there exists a node at which sincere bidding by all bidders is not an ex post 
equilibrium. I then examine properties of the sincere bidding equilibrium. Finally, I 
provide two modifications of the Ausubel auction in which sincere bidding by all 
bidders is an ex post perfect equilibrium.   
In Chapter 2, I study a rescheduling problem in the Ground Delay Program. 
The Ground Delay Program is an air traffic control program in the United States. 
When inclement weather strikes an airport, the airport needs to reduce arrival slots 
and reassigns flights to available slots. I first show that FAA's current mechanism 
may not maximize the number of flights assigned to available slots. To resolve this 
inefficiency, I introduce a new efficiency criterion, universal non-wastefulness. 
Then, I design a new mechanism that satisfies universal non-wastefulness and a 
fairness requirement. Furthermore, I show that no airline has an incentive to 
misreport flight delay under our mechanism. 
In Chapter 3, I study voting rules. Jean-Charles de Borda (1774) provided 
an example in which the plurality rule selects an alternative, so-called 
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pairwise-majority-loser, which is defeated by any other alternative in pairwise 
comparison. To avoid selecting such an alternative, he introduced a new social 
choice rule, called the Borda rule. A social choice rule satisfies Borda's criterion if it 
never selects a pairwise-majority-loser. I show that the Borda rule is the only social 
choice rule which satisfies anonymity, neutrality, consistency, continuity, and 
Borda's criterion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
